You say you want a revolution

Is this revolution with Trump or Reactionary Zionism

Framed in my view the question becomes can micro-serf cubicle dwellers revolt? What would this revolt be like since the stake is all and everything that is? Would overthrow of actually existing conditions not destroy the existing perceptions of the good? Can Trump votes be viewed as an attempt at revolutionary change from above? Is this even possible? And if possible, by allowing the actually existing order to prevail intact economically -laws remain protecting the sacred right of corporate persons and laws remain protecting obscene wealth-and Federal militarism remains intact -what is this change from above other than paint and ads for a new model car so much better than last years model? Can you tear down the master’s house with the master’s tools? Are not elections the chief tool of creating consent of the governed?

From of Two Minds-below this snip my opinion is a cite from the Anatomy of Revolution

For a rundown of the policies that have exacerbated wealth inequality, consider the following excerpts from Time magazine, September 2020: The Top 1% of Americans Have Taken $50 Trillion From the Bottom 90% -- And That's Made the U.S. Less Secure.

"There are some who blame the current plight of working Americans on structural changes in the underlying economy--on automation, and especially on globalization. According to this popular narrative, the lower wages of the past 40 years were the unfortunate but necessary price of keeping American businesses competitive in an increasingly cutthroat global market. But in fact, the $50 trillion transfer of wealth the RAND report documents has occurred entirely within the American economy, not between it and its trading partners. No, this upward redistribution of income, wealth, and power wasn't inevitable; it was a choice--a direct result of the trickle-down policies we chose to implement since 1975.

We chose to cut taxes on billionaires and to deregulate the financial industry. We chose to allow CEOs to manipulate share prices through stock buybacks, and to lavishly reward themselves with the proceeds. We chose to permit giant corporations, through mergers and acquisitions, to accumulate the vast monopoly power necessary to dictate both prices charged and wages paid. We chose to erode the minimum wage and the overtime threshold and the bargaining power of labor. For four decades, we chose to elect political leaders who put the material interests of the rich and powerful above those of the American people."

In other words, extreme wealth inequality is not the result of economic forces outside our control; it's the result of our policy responses to changing social, political and economic conditions. While those benefiting from the policies attribute the asymmetric distribution of the economy's gains to "forces outside our control" such as globalization and automation, those losing ground sense that this is an excuse for taking advantage of the situation, to the detriment of the national interest.

We can best understand extreme wealth inequality as the destabilizing result of one set of competing economic interests gaining dominance over other economic interests: broadly speaking, the balance between labor and capital has collapsed in favor of capital. To take one example, consider the minimum wage, which did not kept up with inflation for decades as a policy decision.

The different interests within each sector can also destabilize into asymmetric distributions. For example, within the broad category of capital, there are many competing interests: industrial capital, financial capital, land-based capital, domestic and global interests, and so on. Within labor, there are blue-collar and white collar interests, and gradations of skills, regional interests, and so on.

Broadly speaking, globalization and financialization greatly increased the share of some interests at the expense of others.

The social boundaries of what's acceptable and unacceptable change, enabling or restricting financial policies. For example, in the postwar boom of the 1950s, corporate CEOs earned multiples of their average employee that by today's standards were ludicrously low, as present-day CEOs routinely take home compensation (including stock options) that are in the tens of millions of dollars annually.

In the broad sweep of history, extreme asymmetries in the distribution of the economy's output are rebalanced one way or the other, if not with policy changes than by the overthrow of the status quo. The book The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century breaks down the various pieces of this complex puzzle.

The history and data are too varied to be easily summarized, but we can start with humanity's innate sense of fairness in social organizations: we sense when our contributions are getting short shrift while others are grabbing shares that are not commensurate with their contributions--despite their claims to "earning" their outsized shares.

Some write this off as envy, and to be sure envy is an innate human response, but fairness and envy are two different things. If someone strips us of power that we once held to benefit their own accumulation of wealth, our sense that this is unfair is not envy.

We seem to be approaching the point where a rebalancing of extreme asymmetries is at hand, and so we have to choose between policy changes and social upheaval. Those benefiting from the current asymmetrical distribution naturally feel that all is right with the world, while those whose purchasing power and political power have been stripmined feel that regaining what was taken from them is only fair. https://www.zerohedge.com/political/seeds-social-revolution-extreme-wealth-inequality

Pre-revolution and Uniformities of Revolution. https://colorado.pressbooks.pub/revolution/chapter/crane-brinton-the-anatomy-of-revolution/

Crane Brinton compares and extracts similarities between ‘pre-revolution’ Russia, America, Britain, and France. He then compiled these similarities into the general uniformities seen within the revolutions studied.  Brinton explains that uniformities support the idea that historical events are not necessarily unique. Instead, uniformities can be systematically identified to predict revolutions. The first of the five uniformities that Brinton identifies is that societies are usually on the ‘up,’ meaning they are economically prospering before revolutions occur. Hence, revolutions do not occur because of ‘starving miserable people’ (Brinton, 1965, pp.250). People that are optimistic and hopeful start revolutions, not when they are hungry, people revolt when they are unhappy. When people hold a government to a certain standard, they expect a certain quality of life threshold. If the government does not satisfy those needs and expectations, they could be in a ‘pre-revolution’ state.

The second uniformity that Brinton identifies is “bitter class antagonism” (Brinton 1965) In societies that tend to have more ‘equal’ classes, more class bitterness exists. The bitterness is typically measured by economic, social, and religious factors. Therefore, the bitterness causes tensions between the ruling class such as the aristocrats and merchant classes and not between the general elites and the downtrodden (pp.251). This is due to the relatively similar ‘wants and needs’ of both classes. However, there is enough of a difference in which tension can grow whether it be because of what God “ordained” or the society’s cultures calls for. These economic, social, and religious restrictions hold down people of all classes. The struggle between classes exposes the “restrictions” or the entry barriers of each class and causes tensions between classes.

The third uniformity that Brinton notes is “the transfer of allegiance of intellectuals” (pp.251). Brinton observes that intellectuals start to side with ‘revolutionary groups’ due to discontent with the way their society operates. The discontent by intellectuals, and their want for change, means that they align themselves against the government.

The fourth uniformity is the ‘inefficiency of governance.’ Government is inefficient, partly through neglect. An example would be the government failing to tax people justly and not organize its finances, thus going bankrupt. The government is also unable to keep up with the speed of change in society and technology/development (pp.251).

Lastly, the fifth uniformity that was observed by Brinton is that the old ruling class come to distrust themselves (pp.252). The old ruling class may lose faith in their class’s old habits and traditions, grow intellectual, become humanitarian, or go over to the opposing side. Overall, these five uniformities are central to Brinton’s theory of revolution, and they make up the anatomy of a revolution. While these uniformities may not necessarily exist in all revolutions, it is interesting to see how they apply to different revolutions. Not all revolutions have the same circumstances, and they all have different ways in which these uniformities are satisfied.